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Abstract
Mechanization (or automation)  the replacement by machines of humans (and animals)
engaged in production tasks  has proceeded continuously since the Industrial Revolution
and seems to have accelerated recently due to the rapid advancement of information tech-
nology. This paper examines interactions among long-run trends of mechanization, shifts of
tasks humans perform, and earnings levels and inequality. Specically, the paper develops
a Ricardian model of task assignment and analyzes how improvements of productivities of
machines and an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers a¤ect task assignment
(which factor performs which task), earnings levels and inequality, and aggregate output.
The model succeeds in capturing the great majority of the long-run trends. The paper also
explores possible future trends of the variables when information technology continues to
grow rapidly.
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1 Introduction
Mechanization (or automation)   the replacement by machines of humans (and animals)
engaged in production tasks  has proceeded continuously since the Industrial Revolution
and seems to have accelerated recently due to the rapid advancement of information tech-
nology. This paper examines interactions among long-run trends of mechanization, shifts of
tasks humans perform, and earnings levels and inequality. Specically, the paper develops
a Ricardian model of task assignment and analyzes how improvements of productivities of
machines and an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers a¤ect task assignment
(which factor performs which task), earnings levels and inequality, and aggregate output.
The model succeeds in capturing the great majority of the long-run trends. The paper also
explores possible future trends of the variables when information technology continues to
grow rapidly.
Facts. The long-run trends the paper focuses on are as follows.
Mechanization: During the Industrial Revolution, mechanization progressed in tasks
intensive in manual labor: in manufacturing (particularly, textile and metal working), ma-
chines and factory workers replaced artisans and farmers engaged in side jobs; in trans-
portation, railroads and steamboats supplanted wagons and sailboats; and in agriculture,
threshing machines and reapers reduced labor input.1 During the Second Industrial Rev-
olution (from the second half of the 19th century to World War I), with the utilization of
electric power and internal combustion engines, mechanization proceeded further in manual
tasks: in manufacturing, broader sectors and production processes were mechanized with
the introduction of mass production system; a wider range of tasks were mechanized with
tractors in agriculture and with automobiles and trucks in transportation. Some analyti-
cal (cognitive) tasks too were mechanized: tabulating machines substituted data-processing
workers at large organizations. In the post World War II era, especially since the 1970s,
analytical tasks in much wider areas have been mechanized because of the progress of infor-
mation technology: computers replaced clerical workers engaged in information processing
tasks; sensors mechanized inspection processes in manufacturing and services; and simple
troubleshooting tasks were automated with the construction of databases of known troubles.2
Task shifts: As a result of mechanization, humans have shifted to tasks machines cannot
perform e¢ ciently. The general trend until about the 1960s is the shift from manual tasks
to analytical tasks: initially, humans shifted from manual tasks at farms, cottages, and
workshops to manual tasks at factories and analytical tasks at o¢ ces and factories (generally
associated with clerical, management, and technical jobs); after mechanization deepened in
manufacturing, they shifted from manual tasks at factories as well as at farms to analytical
tasks (Katz and Margo, 2013).3 Since the 1970s, they have shifted from routine analytical
1Works on the two revolutions by economic historians include Landes (2003) and Mokyr (1985, 1999).
2Case studies of e¤ects of information technology on the workplace include Autor, Levy, and Murnane
(2002) on a commercial bank and Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) on a bulb manufacturing factory.
3Although it has been widely thought that technical change during the 19th century is unskill-biased,
Katz and Margo (2013) show that this is not the case for the U.S.: while the share of middle-skill workers
(artisans and agricultural operators) fell and shares of low-skill workers (unskilled workers and laborers)
and high-skill workers (white collar) rose in manufacturing, in the whole economy, shares of low-skill and
middle-skill workers fell and high-skill workers rose from 1850 to 1910. (The share of middle-skill workers
1
tasks (e.g. simple information processing tasks performed by clerks) as well as manual tasks
toward non-routine analytical tasks (mainly associated with professional and technical jobs)
and non-routine manual tasks in services (e.g. personal care and protective service) owing
to the growth of information technology (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011).4 ;5 Since the 1990s, due to the large shift from routine analytical tasks, the
growth of middle-wage jobs has been weak relative to both low-wage and high-wage jobs, i.e.
job polarization has been observed (Autor, 2015; Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014).
Earnings levels and inequality: Mechanization has a¤ected relative demands for workers
of di¤erent skill levels and thus earnings levels and inequality. In the early stage of indus-
trialization, earnings of unskilled workers grew very moderately and the inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers enlarged (Feinstein, 1998; Katz and Margo, 2013).6 In later
periods, unskilled workers have beneted more from mechanization, while, as before, the
rising inequality has been the norm in economies with lightly regulated labor markets, ex-
cept in periods of rapid growth of the relative supply of skilled workers and in the 1940s,
when the inequality fell (Goldin and Katz, 1998, 2008).7 Since the 1990s, associated with
job polarization, wage polarization (the slower wage growth of middle-wage jobs relative to
low-wage and high-wage jobs) has occurred in the U.S., although the evidence for Europe is
mixed (Autor, 2015; Böhm, 2015; Naticchioni, Massari, and Ragusa, 2014).8
The model. The model economy is a static small-open competitive economy where
three kinds of factors of production  skilled workers, unskilled workers, and machines 
are available. Each factor is characterized by analytical ability and manual ability. Skilled
workers have a higher level of analytical ability than unskilled workers, while both types
of workers have the same level of manual ability, reecting the fact that there is no strong
changed little if clerical/sales workers are classied as middle-skilled.) They also nd that the same pattern
is observed for the whole economy from 1920 to 1980 and the declining share of low-skill workers is driven by
farm laborers until around 1950 and by unskilled workers and laborers (largely in manufacturing) thereafter.
4Similarly to Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), routine tasks refer to tasks whose procedures are orga-
nized so that they can be performed by machines after relevant technologies are developed.
5Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) examine changes in the composition of tasks in the U.S. from 1960
to 1998 and nd that the growth of information technology is important in explaining the changes after the
1970s. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) explore changes in occupational composition for 1959 2007.
6Feinstein (1998) nds that real wages of British manual workers rose very moderately from the 1770s to
the 1850s (stagnated until the 1830s), implying a large rise in the disparity with skilled workers. Katz and
Margo (2013) nd a secular rise in the wage premium for white-collar workers for 1820 80 in the U.S..
7Goldin and Katz (1998), using data for 1909 40, show that the introduction of mass production methods
raised the relative demand for skilled workers in U.S. manufacturing. Goldin and Katz (2008) document
that, after plummeting in the 1940s, the return to college education in the U.S. kept rising except in the
1970s when the relative supply of college graduates grew rapidly. As for the return to high school education,
which is a good measure of inequality between skilled and unskilled workers until the 1940s (judging from a
low elasticity of substitution between high school graduates and dropouts), it fell greatly from 1914 to 1939,
when high school enrollment rates rose dramatically (from 20% to over 70%) and in the 1940s.
8For the U.S., Autor (2015) nds the evidence of wage polarization for 1989 1999, but rising inequality
for 1999 2007 and falling inequality for 2007 2012. While Autor (2015) does not control for time-varying
skill composition of workers engaged in each job, Böhm (2015) controls for the composition change and nds
the robust evidence of wage polarization for 1989 1999 and some evidence of polarization for 1999 2007.
For Europe, Naticchioni, Massari, and Ragusa (2014) nd no evidence of unconditional polarization,
weak evidence of conditional polarization (conditional on technology variables) in individual-level data for
1996 2007, and no evidence in industry-level data for 1980 2005.
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correlation between the two abilities, except in poorest countries.
The nal good is produced from inputs of a continuum of tasks that are di¤erent in
the importance of analytical ability, a; and the ease of codication (routinization); c; using
a Leontief technology.9 In the real economy, low a and high c tasks are those involving
repetitive motions such as assembling or sorting objects and typical in production jobs; low
a and low c tasks are those entailing non-repetitive motions such as driving vehicles and
caring for the elderly and usual in low-wage service jobs; high a and high c tasks entail
simple information processing such as calculation and recording information and are typical
in clerical jobs; and high a and low c tasks involve complex analysis and judgement mainly
associated with management, professional, and technical jobs.
The three factors are perfectly substitutable at each task. Both abilities contribute to
production at each task (except the most manual and the most analytical tasks), but the
relative contribution of analytical ability is higher in tasks of the greater importance of the
ability. Given the abilitys importance, machines are more productive in tasks of the greater
ease of codication, while workersproductivities do not depend on the ease of codication.
A competitive equilibrium determines task assignment, factor prices, task prices, and
output etc. Comparative advantages of factors determine task assignment: unskilled (skilled)
workers are assigned to relatively manual (analytical) tasks and machines are assigned to
tasks that are easier to codify. Among tasks a given factor is employed, it is employed
heavily in tasks in which its productivities are low.
Main results. Based on the model, the paper examines how task assignment, earnings,
earnings inequality, and output change over time, when analytical and manual abilities of
machines and the relative supply of skilled workers grow exogenously over time.
Section 4 analyzes a simpler case in which the two abilities grow proportionately and
machines have comparative advantages in relatively manual tasks. The analysis shows that
tasks and workers strongly a¤ected by mechanization and e¤ects of the productivity growth
on earnings and the inequality change over time. Mechanization starts from tasks that
are highly manual and easy to routinize, and gradually spreads to tasks that are more
analytical and di¢ cult to routinize. Eventually, mechanization proceeds in highly analytical
tasks previously performed by skilled workers too. Accordingly, unskilled workers shift to
tasks that are more di¢ cult to codify, so do skilled workers in later stages of mechanization,
and both types shift to more analytical tasks except at the nal stage. Skilled workers always
benet from the productivity growth, whereas the e¤ect on earnings of unskilled workers is
ambiguous while mechanization mainly a¤ects them and the e¤ect turns positive afterwards.
Earnings inequality rises except at the nal stage, where it does not change. The output
of the nal good always increases. In contrast, an increase in the relative supply of skilled
workers raises (lowers) earnings of unskilled (skilled) workers and lowers the inequality,
countervailing the inequality-enhancing e¤ect of productivity growth (it also raises output).
The results are consistent with the long-run trends of task shifts, earnings, and the
inequality described earlier, except job polarization after the 1990s and the development
of earnings and the inequality after the 1980s and in the wartime 1940s. However, the
assumption that the two abilities grow proportionately, which makes the analysis simple, is
9In this paper, the term codify/routinize means "organize procedures of tasks systematically so that tasks
can be performed by machines after relevant technologies are developed".
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rather restrictive, considering that the growth of manual ability was faster than analytical
ability most of the time, while analytical ability seems to have been growing faster recently.
Hence, Section 5 analyzes the general case in which the two abilities may grow at di¤erent
rates. Under realistic productivity growth, the model does much better jobs in explaining
the development after the 1980s than under the special case (it is still inconsistent with the
development in the 1940s). In particular, the model predicts that skilled workers shift from
non-routine analytical tasks to manual tasks when the growth of analytical ability is fast,
consistent with the development after around the year 2000 in the U.S. (Beaudry, Green,
and Sand, 2016).10 Although the job and wage polarization is beyond the scope of the model
with two types of workers, the falling inequality predicted by the model captures a part of
the development, the falling inequality between low-skill and middle-skill workers observed
at least in the U.S..
Finally, the model is used to examine possible future trends of the variables when infor-
mation technology and thus the analytical ability of machines continue to grow rapidly. It
is found that earnings of both skilled and unskilled workers increase and earnings inequality
falls over time, although the analysis based on the model with two types of workers may not
capture the whole picture, considering the recent widening inequality between moderately
and extremely high-skill workers (Alvaredo et al., 2013).
Related literature. The paper belongs to the literature on task (job) assignment
model, which has been developed to analyze the distribution of earnings in labor economics
(see Sattinger, 1993, for a review), and recently is used to examine broad issues, such
as e¤ects of technology on the labor market (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2016), on cross-country productivity di¤erences (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001),
and on organizational structure and wages (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006), e¤ects of
international trade and o¤shoring on the labor market (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008;
Costinot and Vogel, 2010, and Grossman, Helpman, and Kircher, 2015), and inter-industry
wage di¤erentials and the e¤ect of trade on wages (Sampson, 2016).11
The most closely related is Acemoglu and Autor (2011), who argue that the conventional
non-assignment model cannot examine shifts in tasks workers with a given skill level perform
and fails to capture a large part of recent trends of task shifts, earnings, and earnings
inequality, particularly job and wage polarization and stagnant or negative earnings growth
of less-educated workers in the U.S.,12 and develop a task assignment model with three types
10Beaudry, Green, and Sand (2016) nd that the employment growth of non-routine analytical jobs stalled
after around 2000, while the supply of high-skill workers continued to grow, suggesting a decrease in the
demand for such jobs. Further, they show that the average intensity of non-routine analytical tasks for
college graduates increased from the early 1980s until around 2000 but decreased thereafter.
11See also Nakamura and Nakamura (2015), who develop a model of mechanization through capital accu-
mulation that provides a microfoundation for the neoclassical production function.
12Limitations of the conventional model, in which workers with di¤erent skill levels are imperfect sub-
stitutes in a macro production function, pointed out by them and relevant to this paper are: (i) technical
change is factor-augmenting, thus it does not model mechanization through technical change, which is also
pointed out in the literature on growth models with mechanization reviewed below, (ii) the model cannot ex-
plain stagnant or negative earnings growth of particular groups in a growing economy, (iii) since all workers
with a given skill level have the same job, shifts in jobs and tasks performed by particular groups cannot
be examined, (iv) systematic changes in the composition of employment by job (task) cannot be analyzed,
(v) typically, workers are two type and thus it cannot examine job and wage polarization.
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of workers (high-skill, middle-skill, low-skill), which is a generalization of the Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (2001) model with two types of workers. The nal good is produced from inputs of
a continuum of tasks that are di¤erent in the degree of complexityusing a Cobb-Douglas
technology. High (middle) skill workers have comparative advantages in more complex tasks
against middle (low) skill workers. After examining the model economy without capital, they
analyze the situation where a part of tasks initially performed by middle-skill workers come
to be mechanized exogenously, and show that a fraction of them shift to tasks previously
performed by the other types of workers and relative earnings of high-skill workers to middle-
skill workers rise and those of middle-skill workers to low-skill workers fall, reproducing job
and wage polarization.13 ;14
The present paper builds on their work, particularly in the modeling, but there are sev-
eral important di¤erences. First, the paper is interested in the long-run trends of task shifts,
earnings, and earnings inequality since the Industrial Revolution, while they focus on the
recent development, especially job and wage polarization after the 1990s. Second, the paper
examines how tasks and workers strongly a¤ected by mechanization and its e¤ects on earn-
ings and the inequality change endogenously over time with improvements of manual and
analytical abilities of machines, whereas, because of their focus on job and wage polariza-
tion, they assume that mechanization occurs at tasks previously performed by middle-skill
workers. Third, in order to examine the long-run trends, in particular, the changing impact
of productivity growth on particular tasks and workers, the present model assumes that
tasks are di¤erent in two dimensions, the importance of analytical ability and the ease of
codication (routinization); while, in their model, tasks are di¤erent in one dimension, the
degree of complexity.
The paper is also related to the literature that examines the interaction between mech-
anization and economic growth, such as Zeira (1998, 2010), Boldrin and Levine (2002),
Givon (2006), Zuleta (2008), Acemoglu (2010), and Peretto and Seater (2013). The litera-
ture is mainly interested in whether persistent growth is possible in models where economies
grow through mechanization and whether the dynamics are consistent with stylized facts
of growth. While the standard model assumes labor-augmenting technical change, which
is labor-saving but not capital-using (thus does not capture mechanization), these papers
(except Zeira, 2010) consider technical change that is labor-saving and capital-using.15 Such
13They also examine the situation where a part of tasks initially performed by middle-skill workers come
to be o¤shored exogenously. Further, they analyze the e¤ect of changes in factor supplies on technical change
using a version of the model with endogenous factor-augmenting technical change.
14Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) develop a dynamic task assignment model with two types of technological
changes, the automation of tasks replacing labor with capital and the development of new tasks replacing the
least complexexisting tasks. Their main interests are to characterize conditions for asymptotically stable
balanced growth for a version of the model with endogenous technological changes and one type of labor
(and capital and intermediates embodying technologies) and to examine the e¤ect of shocks to technologies
on factor prices and factor shares in employment and income. In an extension, they also consider a version
of the model with exogenous technological changes and two types of labor (skilled labor has a comparative
advantage in more complextasks) and examine the e¤ect of technological changes on wage inequality. In
particular, they show that automation raises wage inequality.
15Acemoglu (2010) examines whether labor scarcity encourages technological advances and shows that it
does if technology is strongly labor saving. He also shows that models with mechanization-type technological
change have a tendency for strongly labor-saving technology, based on the Zeira (1998) model.
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technical change typically implies the decreasing (increasing) share of labor (capital) income
over time, which is consistent with the declining labor share of the real economy (Bentolila
and Saint-Paul, 2003; Neiman, 2013).16 By contrast, given technologies, Zeira (2010) exam-
ines interactions among capital accumulation, changes in factor prices, and mechanization.
His model can be interpreted as a dynamic task assignment model after a slight modication
of the production technology. However, the model assumes homogenous labor and constant
productivity of machines and thus cannot examine the issue this paper focuses on.
Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model and Section 3 derives equilibrium allocations, given machine abilities. Section
4 examines e¤ects of improved machine abilities and increased relative supply of skilled
workers on task assignment, earnings levels and inequality, and aggregate output, when the
two abilities improve proportionately. Section 5 examines the general case in which the
abilities may improve at di¤erent rates, and Section 6 concludes. Appendix A presents
lemmas, and Appendix B contains proofs of lemmas and propositions, except Propositions
4 7 whose proofs are very lengthy and are posted on the authors web site.17
2 Model
Consider a small open economy where three types of factors of production  skilled workers,
unskilled workers, and machines  are available. All markets are perfectly competitive.
Factors of production and Tasks: Each factor is characterized by analytical ability
and manual ability. Denote analytical abilities of a skilled worker, an unskilled worker,
and a machine by h; la, and ka, respectively, where h > la, and their manual abilities by
lm, lm, and km; respectively. Two types of workers have the same level of manual ability,
reecting the fact that there is no strong correlation between the two abilities, except in
poorest countries. The nal good is produced from inputs of a continuum of tasks that
are di¤erent in the importance of analytical ability, a 2 [0; 1], and the ease of codication
(routinization), c 2 [0; 1]. In the real economy, low a and high c tasks are those involving
repetitive motions such as assembling or sorting objects and typical in production jobs; low
a and low c tasks are those entailing non-repetitive motions such as driving vehicles and
caring for the elderly and usual in low-wage service jobs; high a and high c tasks entail
simple information processing such as calculation and recording information and are typical
in clerical jobs; and high a and low c tasks involve complex analysis and judgement mainly
associated with management, professional, and technical jobs.
Tasks are uniformly distributed over the (a; c) space, and productivities of a skilled
worker, an unskilled worker, and a machine in task (a; c) are given by:
Ah(a) = ah+ (1  a)lm; (1)
Al(a) = ala + (1  a)lm; (2)
cAk(a) = c[aka + (1  a)km]: (3)
16Neiman (2013) nds that the labor share declines signicantly in the large majority of 59 countries and
industries based on data between 1975 and 2012. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) nd that the labor share
declines between 1970 and 1990 for most of 12 OECD countries.
17The address is http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~yuki/english.html.
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Except the most manual tasks (a = 0) and the most analytical tasks (a = 1), both abilities
contribute to production in each task, but the relative contribution of analytical ability is
greater in tasks with higher a.18 For given a, machines are more productive in tasks with
higher c, while workers are assumed to be equally productive for any c. Since h > la, skilled
workers have comparative advantages in more analytical tasks relative to unskilled workers.
Production: At each task, the three factors are perfectly substitutable and thus the
production function of task (a; c) is expressed as:
y(a; c) = Ah(a)nh(a; c) + Al(a)nl(a; c) + cAk(a)nk(a; c); (4)
where ni(a; c) (i = h; l; k) is the measure of factor i engaged in the task. The output of the
task, y(a; c), may be interpreted as either an intermediate good or a direct input in nal
good production, which is produced by either nal good producers or separate entities.
The nal good production function is Leontief with equal weights on all tasks, that is,
all tasks are equally essential in the production:
Y = min
a;c
fy(a; c)g: (5)
The Leontief specication is assumed for simplicity. Similar results would be obtained as
long as di¤erent types of tasks are complementary in the production, although more general
specications seem to be analytically intractable.19
Factor markets: A unit of each factor supplies a unit of time inelastically. Let the
nal good be a numeraire and let the relative price of (the output of) task (a; c) be p(a; c).
Then, from cost minimization problems of intermediate producers,
p(a; c) = min

wh
Ah(a)
;
wl
Al(a)
;
r
cAk(a)

; (6)
where wh (wl) is earnings of a skilled (unskilled) worker and r is exogenous (and constant)
interest rate.20 That is, producers choose a factor(s) so that a unit cost of task production
becomes lowest.
From the equation, the basic pattern of task assignment can be derived (details are
explained later). Since the relative productivity of skilled to unskilled workers Ah(a)
Al(a)
increases
with a, there exists unique a 2 (0; 1) satisfying Ah(a)
Al(a)
= wh
wl
and unskilled (skilled) workers
are chosen over skilled (unskilled) workers for a < (>)a. That is, unskilled (skilled) workers
are assigned to relatively manual (analytical) tasks. Of course, which factor is employed in
a given task depends on the relative protability of workers to machines as well. For a < a,
unskilled workers (machines) are assigned to tasks (a; c) with Al(a)
cAk(a)
> (<)wl
r
, and for a > a,
18One interpretation of the specication is that a task with certain a is composed of the proportion a of
analytical subtasks, where only analytical ability is useful, and the proportion 1 a of manual ones, and the
two types of subtasks requiring di¤erent abilities are perfectly substitutable in the production of the task.
(Due to indivisibility of subtasks and economies of scope, one needs to perform both types of subtasks.)
19The model with a Cobb-Douglas technology seems to be quite di¢ cult to analyze. An advantage of the
Leontief specication over the Cobb-Douglas is that, as shown below, it yields a realistic result that, among
tasks a certain factor is employed, it is employed heavily in tasks in which their productivities are low.
20The closed economy model is analytically intractable. Considering that the real interest rate has been
stable in the U.K. and the U.S. over the long-run, main results would not be a¤ected much by the assumption
of the small open economy.
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skilled workers (machines) are assigned to tasks (a; c) with Ah(a)
cAk(a)
> (<)wh
r
. Comparative
advantages of factors and relative factor prices determine task assignment.
Task (intermediate) markets: Because each task (intermediate good) is equally es-
sential in nal good production, y(a; c) = Y must hold for any (a; c). Thus, the following
is true for any (a; c) with nh(a; c) > 0, any (a0; c0) with nl(a0; c0) > 0, and any (a00; c00) with
nk(a
00; c00) > 0, except for the set of measure 0 tasks in which multiple factors are employed:
Ah(a)nh(a; c) = Al(a
0)nl(a0; c0) = c00Ak(a00)nk(a00; c00) = Y: (7)
Given the task assignment, factors are employed heavily in low productivity tasks.
Denote the measure of total supply of factor i (i = h; l; k) by Ni (Nk is endogenous).
Then, by substituting (7) into
RR
ni(a;c)>0
ni(a; c)dadc = Ni,
NhRR
nh(a;c)>0
1
Ah(a)
dadc
=
NlRR
nl(a;c)>0
1
Al(a)
dadc
=
NkRR
nk(a;c)>0
1
cAk(a)
dadc
= Y: (8)
The rst equality of the equation is one of the two key equations, which states that task
assignment must be determined so that demands for two types of workers satisfy the equality.
Since the nal good is a numeraire and a unit of the nal good is produced from inputs
of a unit of every task,ZZ
p(a; c)dadc = 1 (9)
, wl
ZZ
nl(a;c)>0
1
Al(a)
dadc+ wh
ZZ
nh(a;c)>0
1
Ah(a)
dadc+ r
ZZ
nk(a;c)>0
1
cAk(a)
dadc = 1; (10)
where the second equation is from (6). (10) is the second key equation, which states that
task assignment is determined so that the unit production cost of the nal good equals 1.
Equilibrium: A competitive equilibrium is dened by (6) (8), (10), and the task assign-
ment conditions (Ah(a
)
Al(a)
= wh
wl
, Al(a)
cAk(a)
= wl
r
, and Ah(a)
cAk(a)
= wh
r
). By using the task assignment
conditions, the rst equality of (8) and (10) are expressed as equations of wh and wl. Once
the factor prices and thus task assignment are determined from these equations, Nk and Y
(= y(a; c)) are determined from the second and third equalities of (8), respectively; ni(a; c)
(i = h; l; k) is determined from (7); and p(a; c) is determined from (6).
3 Analysis
This section derives task assignment and earnings explicitly, given machine abilities ka and
km. So far, no assumptions are imposed on comparative advantages of machines to labor.
Until Section 5, it is assumed that ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
), that is, machines have comparative
advantages in relatively manual tasks. Then, Al(a)
Ak(a)
and Ah(a)
Ak(a)
increase with a. With this
assumption, the task assignment conditions can be stated more explicitly.
3.1 Task assignment conditions
Remember that, for a < a, unskilled workers (machines) perform tasks (a; c) with Al(a)
cAk(a)
>
(<)wl
r
, and for a > a, skilled workers (machines) perform tasks (a; c) with Ah(a)
cAk(a)
> (<)wh
r
,
where a is dened by Ah(a
)
Al(a)
= wh
wl
. Further, since ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
); humans (machines)
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Figure 1: An example of task assignment when ka
km
< la
lm
and cm < c < ca < 1
perform tasks with relatively high (low) a and low (high) c, and, for given c, machines
perform tasks with a > a only if they perform all tasks with a  a. Based on this pattern
of assignment, critical variables and functions determining task assignment, cm; c; ca; cl(a);
and ch(a), are dened next. (Figure 1 may be useful in understanding the following.)
Unskilled workers vs. machines: From the above discussion, whenever nk(a; c) > 0
for some (a; c), nk(0; 1) > 0, i.e. whenever machines are used, they perform the most manual
and easiest-to-codify task. Dene cm as
Al(0)
cmAk(0)
= lm
cmkm
= wl
r
; i.e. cm is the value of c such
that hiring a machine and hiring an unskilled worker are equally protable at task (0; cm)
(see Figure 1).21 Then, other (a; c)s satisfying Al(a)
cAk(a)
= wl
r
is given by Al(a)
cAk(a)
= lm
cmkm
. Let
cl(a)  kmlm
Al(a)
Ak(a)
cm. Given a, a machine and an unskilled worker are equally protable at
c = cl(a) and the former (latter) is hired for c > (<)cl(a). If there exists c < 1 such that
they are equally protable at a = a, i.e. cl(a) = kmlm
Al(a
)
Ak(a)
cm < 1, machines perform some
tasks with a > a (see Figure 1). If cl(a)  1; machines do not perform any tasks with
a > a: Let c  min fcl(a); 1g :
Skilled workers vs. machines: When c < 1, the choice between a machine and a
skilled worker arises. Since Ah(a
)
Al(a)
= wh
wl
, (a; c)s satisfying Ah(a)
cAk(a)
= wh
r
is given by Ah(a)
cAk(a)
=
lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
1
cm
and let ch(a)  kmlm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
Ah(a)
Ak(a)
cm. Given a, hiring either factor is equally protable
at c = ch(a). If c < 1 exists such that either choice is equally protable at a = 1, i.e. ch(1) =
h
ka
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm < 1, machines perform some tasks with a = 1. Let ca  min fch(1); 1g :
Figure 1 illustrates task assignment on the (a; c) space, assuming cm < c < ca < 1.
Given a, machines perform tasks with higher c. From the assumption that machines have
comparative advantages at relatively manual tasks, for given c; they perform tasks with
lower a and the proportion of tasks performed by machines decreases with a, i.e. cl(a) and
ch(a) are upward sloping. These properties hold when cm < c < ca < 1 is not true too.
21When such cm  1 does not exist, cm is set to be equal 1. Under the assumption kakm < lalm , as illustrated
in Figure 1, cm is the lowest c satisfying nk(a; c) > 0.
9
Figure 2: Values of c and ca on the (a; cm) space when kakm <
la
lm
3.2 Key equations determining equilibrium
From their denitions, cl(a), ch(a); c; and ca are functions of cm and a:
cl(a) =
km
lm
Al(a)
Ak(a)
cm; ch(a) =
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
Ah(a)
Ak(a)
cm; (11)
c  min fcl(a); 1g , ca  min fch(1); 1g : (12)
From the equations dening a and cm, earnings too are functions of cm and a:
wl =
lm
km
r
cm
; wh =
lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
r
cm
: (13)
Hence, the two key equations determining equilibrium, the rst equality of (8) and (10),
can be expressed as equations of cm and a (refer to Figure 1 for the derivation):
Nh
Nl
Z a
0
Z minfcl(a);1g
0
1
Al(a)
dcda =
Z 1
a
Z minfch(a);1g
0
1
Ah(a)
dcda; (HL)
lm
km
r
cm
Z a
0
Z minfcl(a);1g
0
dcda
Al(a)
+
lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
r
cm
Z 1
a
Z minfch(a);1g
0
dcda
Ah(a)
+r
Z a
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
dcda
cAk(a)
+
Z 1
a
Z 1
minfch(a);1g
dadc
cAk(a)

= 1; (P)
Once a and cm are determined from (HL) and (P), c; ca; cl(a); ch(a) and thus task
assignment are determined. Then, earnings are determined from (13), and the remaining
variables are determined as stated in the denition of equilibrium.
The determination of equilibrium aand cm can be illustrated using a gure depicting
graphs of (HL) and (P) on the (a; cm) space. Since, as explained below, the shape of (HL)
di¤ers depending on whether c and ca equal 1 or not, from (11) and (12), the (a; cm) space
is divided into three regions based on values of c and ca, as illustrated in Figure 2.
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(a) Relation of (HL) with Nh
Nl
(b) Relation of (HL) with ka
km
Figure 3: Shape of (HL) and its relations with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
In the gure, when cm  lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
, Al(a)
1Ak(a)  lmcmkm =
wl
r
(from eq. 13), that is, when
an unskilled worker is weakly chosen over a machine at task (a; c) = (a; 1), machines are
not used in any tasks with a > a and thus c = ca = 1 holds.22 When cm  lmkm kah
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
,
h
1ka  lmcmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
= wh
r
(from eq. 13) and cm < lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
, that is, when a skilled worker is
weakly chosen over a machine at task (a; c)=(1; 1) and a machine is strictly chosen over an
unskilled worker at task (a; c)=(a; 1), machines are employed in some tasks with a > a but
not in tasks with a = 1 and c < 1; thus c < ca = 1 holds.23 Finally, when cm < lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
,
machines are employed in some tasks with a = 1 and c < 1 and thus c < ca < 1 holds.
3.3 Shape of (HL) and its relations with exogenous variables
The shape of (HL) and its relations with exogenous variables, Nh
Nl
and ka
km
, are illustrated in
Figure 3, based on Lemmas 1 3 in Appendix A. Note that the shape and the relations do
not depend on the assumption ka
km
< la
lm
, except that the case c=ca=1 (the upper region in
the gure) does not arise when ka
km
 la
lm
and the case c < ca = 1 (the middle region) does
not arise when ka
km
 h
lm
:
The left gure shows that (HL) is negatively sloped when ca = 1 and is vertical when
ca<1 on the (a; cm) space. The shape can be explained intuitively as follows. A decrease in
cm lowers cl(a) and ch(a) from (11) and raises the proportion of tasks performed by machines
(see Figure 1). When ca=1; i.e. machines do not perform any tasks with a=1 and c< 1,
the mechanization mainly a¤ects unskilled workers engaged in relatively manual tasks and
thus they shift to more analytical tasks, i.e. a increases. By contrast, when ca < 1, both
22In this case, unlike Figure 1, cl(a) intersects with c = 1 at a  a on the (a; c) plane.
23In this case, unlike Figure 1, ch(a) intersects with c = 1 at a 2 (a; 1] on the (a; c) plane.
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Figure 4: Shape of (P) and its relations with km; ka; and r
types of workers are equally a¤ected and thus a remains unchanged.
The left and right gures illustrate the relations of (HL) with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
, respectively.
An increase in Nh
Nl
implies that a higher portion of tasks must be engaged by skilled workers
and thus (HL) shifts to the left (given cm; a decreases). Less straightforward is the e¤ect of
an increase in ka
km
, which shifts the locus to the right (left) when cm is high (low), denitely so
when c=1 (when ca<1). An increase in kakm weakens comparative advantages of humans in
analytical tasks and thus lowers, particularly for high a, cl(a), ch(a), and the portion of tasks
performed by humans (see Figure 1). When cm (thus c and ca) is high, such mechanization
mainly a¤ects unskilled workers and thus a must increase,24 while the opposite is true when
cm is low.
3.4 Shape of (P) and its relations with exogenous variables
Figure 4 illustrates the shape of (P) and its relations with exogenous variables, km ka; and
r, based on Lemma 4 in Appendix A. Remember that, for (P) to hold, task assignment
must be determined so that the unit production cost of the nal good equals 1. When cm
increases, a must increase, that is, (P) is upward-sloping on the (a; cm) plane, because,
otherwise, both wl= lmkm
r
cm
and wh=
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
wl fall and thus the unit production cost decreases.
An increase in r raises the cost of hiring machines and thus a higher portion of tasks are
assigned to humans, i.e. the locus shifts upward (given a; cm increases, implying that cl(a)
and ch(a) increase), while the opposite holds when abilities of machines, km and ka; increase.
The locus never intersects with cm = 0; because machines are completely useless and thus
hiring machines are prohibitively expensive at the hardest-to-codify tasks.
As Figure 5 illustrates, equilibrium (a; cm) is determined at the intersection of the two
24For example, when c = ca = 1, cl(a) intersects with c = 1 at a  a on the (a; c) plane. In this case, it
would be clear that the mechanization mainly a¤ects unskilled workers.
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Figure 5: Determination of equilibrium a and cm
loci. Of course, the position of the intersection depends on exogenous variables such as km
and ka. The next two sections examine how increases in km, ka; and
Nh
Nl
a¤ect the equilibrium,
particularly, task assignment, earnings, earnings inequality, and aggregate output.
4 Mechanization with constant kakm
Suppose that abilities of machines, km and ka, improve exogenously over time. This section
examines e¤ects of such productivity growth and of an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment,
earnings levels and inequality, and output, when km and ka satisfying kakm <
la
lm
grow propor-
tionately. Since (HL) does not shift under constant ka
km
(Figure 3 (a)); the analysis is much
simpler than the general case analyzed in the next section.
The next proposition presents the dynamics of the critical variables and functions deter-
mining task assignment of an economy undergoing the productivity growth.
Proposition 1 Suppose that km and ka satisfying kakm <
la
lm
grow over time with ka
km
constant.
(i)When km is very low initially, cm = c = ca = 1 is satised at rst;25 at some point,
cm<c
= ca=1 holds and thereafter cm falls over time; then, cm<c<ca=1 and c too
falls; nally, cm<c<ca<1 and ca falls as well.
(ii) a increases over time when cm < ca = 1, while a is time-invariant when ca < 1 (and
when cm=1).
(iii) cl(a) and ch(a) (when c<1) decrease over time when cm<1.
The results of this proposition can be understood using gures similar to Figure 5. When
the level of km is very low, there are no (a; cm) satisfying (P); or (P) is located at the left
25As noted in footnote 21, the value of cm when all tasks are performed by humans is set to be equal 1.
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(a) Equilibrium (b) Task assignment
Figure 6: Equilibrium and task assignment when cm = c = ca = 1
side of (HL) on the (a; cm) plane (see Figure 6 (a)). Hence, the two loci do not intersect and
an equilibrium with cm< 1 does not exist. Because the manual ability of machines is very
low, hiring machines is not protable at all and thus all tasks are performed by humans.
Figure 6 (a) illustrates an example of the determination of equilibrium cm and a in this
case. Equilibrium a is determined at the intersection of (HL) with cm = 1. Figure 6 (b)
illustrates the corresponding task assignment on the (a; c) plane, which shows that unskilled
(skilled) workers perform all tasks with a< (>)a:
When km becomes high enough that (P) is located at the right side of (HL) at cm=1,
the two loci intersect and thus machines begin to be used, i.e. cm< 1. Note that ka is not
important for the rst step of mechanization, because mechanization starts from the most
manual tasks in which analytical ability is of no use. Because of low machine productivities,
they perform only highly manual and easy-to-codify tasks that were previously performed
by unskilled workers, i.e. c= ca=1 holds. Indeed, large-scale mechanization originated in
tasks associated with simple repetitive motions in textile during the Industrial Revolution.
Figure 7 (a) and (b) respectively illustrate the determination of equilibrium cm and a and
task assignment. Figure 7 (c) presents the e¤ect of small increases in km and ka on the task
assignment. Since machines come to perform a greater portion of highly manual and easy-
to-codify tasks, a increases and cl(a) decreases, that is, workers shift to more analytical
and, for unskilled workers, harder-to-routinize tasks. Consistent with the model, during
early stages of industrialization, humans shifted from manual tasks at farms, cottages, and
workshops toward manual tasks at factories and analytical tasks at o¢ ces and factories
(generally associated with clerical, management, and technical jobs), and manual workers
shifted to tasks involving more complex motions machines were not good at.
As km and ka grow over time, mechanization spreads to relatively analytical tasks, and
eventually, machines come to perform highly analytical tasks, those previously performed by
14
(a) Equilibrium (b) Task assignment (c) E¤ect of productivity growth
with constant ka
km
Figure 7: Equilibrium, task assignment, and the e¤ect of productivity growth with constant
ka
km
when cm < c = ca = 1
(a) Equilibrium (b) Task assignment (c) E¤ect of productivity growth
with constant ka
km
Figure 8: Equilibrium, task assignment, and the e¤ect of productivity growth with constant
ka
km
when cm < c < ca = 1
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(a) Equilibrium (b) Task assignment (c) E¤ect of productivity growth
with constant ka
km
Figure 9: Equilibrium, task assignment, and the e¤ect of productivity growth with constant
ka
km
when cm < c < ca < 1
skilled workers. In the real economy, the new phase of mechanization started during the Sec-
ond Industrial Revolution   e.g. teleprinters replaced Morse code operators and tabulating
machines substituted data-processing workers at large organizations  and has progressed on
a large scale in the post World War II era, especially since the 1970s, because of the growth
of information technology. Figure 8 (a) and (b) respectively illustrate the determination of
equilibrium cm and a and task assignment when cm<c<ca=1. Machines perform some
tasks with a > a but not the most analytical ones, i.e. c < ca = 1. Productivity growth
lowers ch(a) as well as cl(a) (and raises a), thus skilled workers too shift to more di¢ cult-
to-codify tasks (Figure 8 (c)). Congruent with the model, since the 1970s, humans have
shifted from routine analytical tasks (such as simple information processing tasks typical in
clerical jobs) as well as manual tasks toward non-routine analytical tasks mainly associated
with professional and technical jobs and non-routine manual tasks in services.
Finally, the economy reaches the case cm < c < ca < 1, which is illustrated in Figure
9. Machines perform a portion of the most analytical tasks, i.e. ca < 1: In fact, currently,
machines are engaged in some tasks involving analysis and decision-making, such as auto-
mated trading in nancial markets. Unlike the previous cases, productivity growth a¤ects
two type of workers equally and thus a does not change, while ch(a) and cl(a) decrease and
thus workers shift to more di¢ cult-to-codify tasks.
In sum, when the two abilities of machines with ka
km
< la
lm
improve proportionally over
time, mechanization starts from highly manual and easy-to-codify tasks and gradually
spreads to more analytical and harder-to-codify tasks. Eventually, machines come to per-
form highly analytical tasks previously performed by skilled workers. Accordingly, unskilled
workers shift to tasks that are more di¢ cult to codify, so do skilled workers in later stages
of mechanization, and both types shift to more analytical tasks except at the nal stage.
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(a) when cm< c=ca=1 (b) when cm< c< ca=1 (c) when cm< c< ca< 1
Figure 10: E¤ect of an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment when ka
km
< la
lm
The dynamics of task assignment accord with the long-run trends of mechanization and
of shifts in tasks performed by humans, except job polarization after the 1990s, which is
detailed in the introduction and is summarized as: initially, mechanization proceeded in
tasks intensive in manual labor, while mechanization of tasks intensive in analytical labor
started during the Second Industrial Revolution and has progressed on a large scale in the
post World War II era, especially since the 1970s, because of the growth of information
technology; humans shifted from manual tasks to analytical tasks until about the 1960s,
whereas, thereafter, they have shifted away from routine analytical tasks as well as routine
manual tasks toward non-routine analytical tasks and non-routine manual tasks in services.
E¤ects of the productivity growth on earnings levels and inequality, and aggregate output
are examined in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that km and ka satisfying kakm <
la
lm
grow proportionately over time
when cm<1.
(i) Earnings of skilled workers increase over time. When c < ca < 1, earnings of unskilled
workers too increase.
(ii) Earnings inequality, wh
wl
, rises over time when ca=1 and is time-invariant when ca<1.
(iii) The output of the nal good, Y; increases over time.
The proposition shows that, while skilled workers always benet from mechanization,
the e¤ect on earnings of unskilled workers is ambiguous when mechanization mainly a¤ects
them, i.e. when ca = 1; and the e¤ect turns positive when ca < 1. Mechanization worsens
earnings inequality, wh
wl
, when ca=1; while it has no e¤ect when ca< 1. The output of the
nal good always increases, even if la<h< lm and thus workersproductivities, Ah(a) and
Al(a), fall as they shift to more analytical tasks.
So far, the proportion of skilled workers to unskilled workers, Nh
Nl
, is held constant, which
has increased over time in the actual economy. Thus, the next proposition examines e¤ects
of the growth of Nh
Nl
under constant machine qualities.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that Nh
Nl
grows over time when ka
km
< la
lm
and cm<1.
(i) cm, a, c (when c<1); and cl(a) decrease, while ca (when ca<1) and ch(a) (when c<1)
increase over time.
(ii) wl (wh) rises (falls) and earnings inequality,
wh
wl
, shrinks over time.
(iii) Y increases over time under constant Nh+Nl.
Figure 10 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment. Since skilled
workers become abundant relative to unskilled workers, they take over a portion of tasks
previously performed by unskilled workers, i.e. a decreases. Further, earnings of unskilled
workers rise and those of skilled workers fall, thus some tasks previously performed by
unskilled workers are mechanized, i.e. cl(a) decreases, while, when c < 1, skilled workers
take over some tasks performed by machines before, i.e. ch(a) increases. That is, skilled
workers shift to more manual tasks, and unskilled workers shift to harder-to-routinize tasks.
The output of the nal good increases even when the total population is constant, mainly
because skilled workers are more productive than unskilled workers at any tasks with a > 0.
By combining the results on e¤ects of an increase in Nh
Nl
with those of the productivity
growth, the model can explain the long-run trends of earnings and earnings inequality until
the 1970s (except the wartime 1940s) detailed in the introduction, which is: in early stages of
industrialization when mechanization directly a¤ected unskilled workers only and the relative
supply of skilled workers grew slowly, earnings of unskilled workers grew very moderately
and earnings inequality rose; in later periods when skilled workers too were directly a¤ected
by mechanization and the relative supply of skilled workers grew faster, unskilled workers
beneted more from mechanization, while, as before, the rising inequality was the norm in
economies with lightly regulated labor markets (such as the U.S.), except in periods of a
rapid increase in the level of education and in the 1940s, when the inequality fell.26
The model, however, fails to capture the trends after the 1980s, which is: earnings of
unskilled workers stagnated and those of skilled workers rose until the mid 1990s in the U.S.;27
the inequality rose greatly after the 1980s (after the 1990s in many European economies,
OECD, 2008); and wage polarization has proceeded since the 1990s at least in the U.S. By
contrast, the model predicts that earnings of unskilled workers increase and the inequality
shrinks when highly analytical tasks are a¤ected by mechanization, i.e. when ca < 1, and
the relative supply of skilled workers rises.
5 Mechanization with time-varying kakm
The previous section has examined the case in which km and ka grow proportionately. This
special case has been taken up rst for analytical simplicity. However, the assumption of the
proportionate growth is rather restrictive, because, according to the trend of mechanization
26Combined e¤ects of an increase in NhNl and improvements of machine qualities on task assignment accord
with the trend of task shifts in the real economy when c=1:When c<1, they are consistent with the fact,
unless the negative e¤ect of an increase in NhNl on ch(a) is very strong (see Figure 10).
27According to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), real wages of full-time male workers without college degrees
are lower in 1995 than in 1980, while wages of those with more than college education are higher. As for
female workers, real wages rose during the period except for high school dropouts, but the rise was moderate
for those without college degrees.
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(a) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) (b) when ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
)
Figure 11: c and ca on the (a; cm) space when kakm 2( lalm ; hlm ) and when kakm > hlm (> lalm )
described in the introduction, the growth of km was apparently faster than that of ka in
most periods of time, while ka seems to have been growing faster than km recently.28
This section examines the general case in which they may grow at di¤erent rates. This
case is much more di¢ cult to analyze because a change in ka
km
shifts the graph of (HL) as
well as that of (P) (see Figures 3 and 4 in Section 3). Under realistic productivity growth,
the model does much better jobs in explaining the development after the 1980s than in the
constant ka
km
case.
Unlike the previous case, shapes of graphs in Figures 1 and 2 may change qualitatively
with productivity growth. Starting from the situation where ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
) holds, if ka keeps
growing faster than km, i.e. the rapid growth of information technology is long-lasting,
ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
), then ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
) come to be satised. That is, comparative advantages
of machines to two type of workers change over time. As illustrated in Figure 11, when
ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
); c < 1 always holds, and when ka
km
> h
lm
(> la
lm
); ca < c
 < 1 always holds from
c = min
n
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ak(a)
cm;1
o
and ca = min
n
h
ka
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm;1
o
.
Figure 12 illustrates cl(a) and ch(a) and task assignment on the (a; c) space when kakm 2
( la
lm
; h
lm
) (the gure is drawn assuming ca < 1) and when kakm >
h
lm
. Unlike the original case
ka
km
< la
lm
, cl(a) is downward sloping and, when kakm >
h
lm
, ch(c) too is downward sloping. Hence,
when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
); for given c; machines tend to perform tasks with intermediate a and the
proportion of tasks performed by machines is highest at a = a. When ka
km
> h
lm
, for given c;
machines tend to perform relatively analytical tasks and the proportion of tasks performed
by machines increases with a.
28Note that ka seems to have been positive even before the Industrial Revolution. Various machines had
automatic control systems whose major examples are: oat valve regulators used in ancient Greece and in
the medieval Arab world to control the level of water in tanks and devices such as water clocks and oil
lamps; temperature regulators of furnaces invented in early 17th century Europe.
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(a) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) (b) when ka
km
> h
lm
Figure 12: cl(a) and ch(a) when kakm 2( lalm ; hlm ) (ca<1 is assumed) and when kakm > hlm
5.1 E¤ects of changes in km, ka; and NhNl
Now, e¤ects of changes in km and ka on task assignment, earnings levels and inequality, and
output are examined. Since results are di¤erent depending on the shape of (HL) (Figure
3), they are presented in three separate propositions.29 ;30 The next proposition analyzes the
case c=ca=1; which arises only when kakm <
la
lm
.
Proposition 4When cm lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
, c=ca=1 (possible only when kakm < lalm ),
(i) cm decreases and a increases with km and ka (limcm!1
da
dkm
=limcm!1
da
dka
=0):
(ii) cl(a) decreases with km and ka.
(iii) wh,
wh
wl
, and Y increase with km and ka: wl increases with ka.
The only di¤erence from the constant ka
km
case is that wl increases when ka rises with
km unchanged. As before, with improved machine qualities, cm and cl(a) decrease and a
increases, i.e. workers shift to more analytical and, for unskilled workers, harder-to-codify
tasks (see Figure 7 (c) in Section 4), and earnings of skilled workers, earnings inequality wh
wl
,
and output rise.
The next proposition examines the case c<ca=1, which is possible only when kakm <
h
lm
:
Proposition 5When cm2
h
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
; lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)

,c<ca=1 (possible only when kakm < hlm ),
(i) cm decreases with km and ka. a increases when kakm non-increases.
(ii) cl(a) and ch(a) decrease with km and ka.
(iii) wh and Y increase with km and ka, while wl increases with ka.
wh
wl
increases when ka
km
non-increases.
29When kakm >
la
lm
, cm = 1 is possible with c or ca < 1. However, such situation  the most manual and
easy-to-codify task is not mechanized while some of other tasks are   is unrealistic and thus is not examined.
30Proofs of these propositions and Proposition 7 are very lengthy and thus are posted on the authors web
site (http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~yuki/english.html).
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(a) when ka
km
< la
lm
(< h
lm
) (b) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) (c) when ka
km
> h
lm
Figure 13: E¤ect of productivity growth with increasing ka
km
when c; ca < 1
There are several di¤erences from the constant ka
km
case. First, e¤ects of productivity
growth with increasing ka
km
on a and earnings inequality are ambiguous, and wl increases
with ka: Second, although cl(a) (thus cm) and ch(a) decrease and thus workers shift to
harder-to-routinize tasks as in the original case, workers may not shift to more analytical
tasks when a decreases (possible only when ka
km
increases) and when ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
) (see
Figure 12 (a)). Remaining results are same as before, that is, when ka
km
non-increases, a
and earnings inequality increase; when ka
km
 la
lm
too holds, workers shift to more analytical
tasks; and earnings of skilled workers and output always increase.
Proposition 6 examines the case c; ca<1 (c<(>)ca when kakm <(>)
h
lm
).
Proposition 6When cm < lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
, c; ca < 1,
(i) cm and ca decrease with km and ka; and a decreases with kakm .
(ii) cl(a) and ch(a) decrease with km and ka:
(iii) wh and Y increase with km and ka, while wl increases when kakm non-decreases.
wh
wl
decreases with ka
km
.
Unlike the constant ka
km
case, in which a and thus wh
wl
are constant and wl increases over
time, a and wh
wl
decrease with ka
km
, and the e¤ect on wl is ambiguous when kakm decreases.
As for task assignment, while cl(a) (thus cm) and ch(a) decrease as in the original case
(thus workers shift to harder-to-routinize tasks), tasks performed by humans change in the
skill dimension as well. In particular, when ka
km
rises (falls), that is, when productivity
growth is such that comparative advantages of machines to humans in analytical (manual)
tasks rise, unskilled workers shift to more manual (analytical) tasks under ka
km
> (<)la
lm
, and
skilled workers too shift to such tasks under ka
km
> (<) h
lm
.31 Figure 13 illustrates the e¤ect
31When kakm rises (falls) under
ka
km
< (>) lalm , unskilled workers shift to more manual (analytical) tasks at
low c. The same is true for skilled workers under kakm < (>)
h
lm
. (See Figure 13.) Hence, at low c; workers
always shift to more manual (analytical) tasks when kakm rises (falls).
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(a) when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) and ca=1 (b) when
ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) and ca< 1 (c) when kakm >
h
lm
Figure 14: E¤ect of an increase in Nh
Nl
when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
) and when ka
km
> h
lm
of productivity growth with increasing ka
km
on task assignment for this case. (The e¤ect of
productivity growth with decreasing ka
km
can be illustrated by similar gures with increasing
a.) Earnings of skilled workers and output rise as before.
Finally, Proposition 7 examines e¤ects of an increase in Nh
Nl
when ka
km
 la
lm
is allowed.
Proposition 7 Suppose that Nh
Nl
grows over time when cm<1.
(i) cm, a; and cl(a) decrease, while ca (when ca < 1) and ch(a) (when c<1) increase over
time. c (when c<1) falls (rises) when ka
km
 la
lm
( ka
km
 h
lm
).
(ii) wl (wh) rises (falls) and
wh
wl
shrinks over time.
(iii) Y increases over time under constant Nh+Nl.
Figure 14 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase in Nh
Nl
on task assignment when ka
km
2( la
lm
; h
lm
)
and when ka
km
> h
lm
. (Note that c=ca=1 does not occur in these cases and c< ca=1 does
not occur when ka
km
> h
lm
:) As in the original case of ka
km
< la
lm
, skilled workers take over some
tasks previously performed by unskilled workers, i.e. a decreases, and machines (skilled
workers) come to perform a portion of tasks performed by unskilled workers (machines)
before, i.e. cl(a) decreases (ch(a) increases). However, unlike before, cl(a) is downward-
sloping on the (a; c) plane, and, when ka
km
> h
lm
, ch(a) too is downward-sloping. Thus,
unskilled workers shift to harder-to-routinize and more manual tasks, and skilled workers
may not shift to more manual tasks when ka
km
> h
lm
(see Figure 14 (c)). As in the original
case, earnings of unskilled (skilled) workers rise (fall), earnings inequality shrinks, and output
increases.
5.2 Contrasting the model with facts
Based on the propositions, it is examined whether the model with realistic productivity
growth can explain the long-run trends of task shifts, earnings, and earnings inequality in
the real economy.
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Two assumptions are imposed on comparative advantage of machines against humans and
the relative growth of the two abilities of machines. First, it would be plausible to suppose
that ka
km
< la
lm
has continued to hold until now (thus cl(a) and ch(a) are downward-sloping on
the (a; c) plane), since the proportion of tasks performed by machines seems to have been
and be higher in more manual tasks: consider the fact that the vast majority of non-routine
analytical tasks generally associated with management, professional, and technical jobs and
of non-routine "middle a" tasks typical in occupations such as mechanics and nurses are yet
to be mechanized.
Second, the history of mechanization and task shifts described in the introduction sug-
gests that km seems to have grown faster than ka until sometime in the 1990s, after which
the growth of ka appears to be faster because of the growing application of information
technology in many elds.32 The supposed turning point would be not be far o¤ the mark
considering that a decrease in the employment share of production occupations, which are
intensive in manual tasks, is greatest in the 1980s and slowed down considerably after the
1990s, while a decrease in the share of clerical occupations intensive in routine analytical
tasks accelerated after the 1990s, according to Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Note also that
information technology seems to have contributed to the growth of km more than the growth
of ka initially: CNC [Computer Numerical Control] machines and industrial robots, widely
used since the 1970s and the 1980s respectively, raised productivities of machines to perform
manual and relatively non-routine tasks considerably. Hence, suppose that ka
km
falls over time
when ca=1; i.e. none of the most analytical tasks are mechanized, while, when ca< 1, kakm
falls initially, then rises.
Now, the dynamics of earnings and earnings inequality are examined. Since the result
when c= ca=1 is almost the same as the constant kakm case (Proposition 4), the model is
consistent with the actual trends in the early stage of mechanization. The model accords
with the trends in the intermediate stage as well (except a decline of the inequality in the
wartime 1940s), because the result when c < ca = 1 holds and kakm falls is same as before
(Proposition 5). Further, unlike the constant ka
km
case, the model is congruent with stagnant
earnings of U.S. unskilled workers in the 1980s and the early 1990s and the large inequality
rise after the 1980s (after the 1990s in many European nations). This is because the e¤ect
of productivity growth with decreasing ka
km
on their earnings is ambiguous and the e¤ect on
the inequality is positive when c < ca < 1 (Proposition 6); and the growth of NhNl ; which
contributes to raising their earnings and lowering the inequality (Proposition 7), greatly
slowed down during the period. When ka
km
rises under c < ca < 1, earnings of unskilled
workers too grow, which is consistent with the development in the late 1990s and the early
2000s.33 Although the model with two types of workers cannot explain wage polarization
32It is true that several components of the composite analytical ability ka, such as numerical ability, seems
to have been growing faster than the composite manual ability km for much longer periods. But remaining
components, such as analysis and decision-making abilities, seem to have grown slowly until recently.
33According to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), real wages of full-time workers of all education groups ex-
hibited sound growth in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s in the U.S. Earnings growth of low education
groups are stronger for females, probably because a higher proportion of them are in growing service occu-
pations. After around the year 2004, however, earnings of all groups except male workers with post-college
education have stagnated.
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after the 1990s observed at least in the U.S., the falling inequality predicted by the model
captures a part of the development, the shrinking inequality between low-skill and middle-
skill workers.
As for the dynamics of task shifts, the result under c=ca=1 is same as the constant kakm
case, and so is the result under c<ca=1 when kakm <
la
lm
holds and ka
km
falls (Propositions
4 and 5): cl(a) and ch(a) decrease and a increase over time, unless NhNl grows rapidly.
Hence, the dynamics accord with the long-run trend until recently, i.e. workers shift to
more analytical and harder-to-routinize tasks over time. By contrast, when c<ca<1; while
cl(a) and ch(a) decrease over time (unless
Nh
Nl
grows rapidly) as before, unlike the constant
ka
km
case, a increases (decreases) when ka
km
falls (rises) (Proposition 6). Hence, workers shift
to more analytical and harder-to-routinize tasks while ka
km
falls, whereas after ka
km
starts to
rise, they shift to harder-to-codify tasks overall and shift to more manual tasks at low c
(footnote 31). This is consistent with the shift from non-routine analytical tasks as well as
routine tasks to non-routine manual tasks after around the year 2000 in the U.S. (Beaudry,
Green, and Sand, 2016; see footnote 10 in the introduction for details).
In sum, unlike the proportionate growth case, the model with realistic productivity
growth is consistent with a large part of the development after the 1980s, including several
aspects of job and wage polarization after the 1990s. The result suggests that mechanization
driven by the rising productivity of machines and the increased proportion of skilled workers
are important in understanding the long-term evolution of task shifts, earnings levels and
inequality from the era of the Industrial Revolution until the present. Of course, other
factors, such as increased trade with and increased o¤shoring to developing countries after
the 1990s (Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 2013; Ebenstein et al., 2014), too have signicant
e¤ects,34 but only the two changes considered in the paper seem to have inuenced the
evolution continuously.
If the rapid progress of information technology continues and ka
km
keeps rising, compara-
tive advantages of machines to two type of workers could change over time, i.e. rst, from
ka
km
< la
lm
to ka
km
2 ( la
lm
; h
lm
), then to ka
km
> h
lm
. The model predicts what will happen to task
assignment, earnings, and earnings inequality under such situations. As before, both types
of workers shift to tasks that are more di¢ cult to routinize (unless Nh
Nl
rises greatly, which
is very unlikely). By contrast, unlike before, unskilled workers shift to more manual tasks
(even at high c), and, when ka
km
> h
lm
, skilled workers too shift to such tasks (see Figure 13).
That is, workers will shift to relatively manual and di¢ cult-to-codify tasks: the recent shift
to low-wage service occupations such as personal care and protective service may continue
into the future. Earnings of unskilled workers as well as those of skilled workers will rise, and
earnings inequality will shrink over time. The analysis based on the model with two types
of workers may not capture the whole picture, considering the recent widening inequality
between moderately and extremely high-skill workers (Alvaredo et al., 2013). And, the ex-
tended model with more than two types of workers would not be su¢ cient to understand
the evolution of the right tail of the distribution at which, Alvaredo et al. (2013), based
34Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2013) nd that the e¤ect of o¤shoring or trade on wage inequality is
important after the 1990s and strong in the 2000s for the U.S. economy. Ebenstein et al. (2014) nd that
the e¤ect on real wages and employment is large after 1997 (until the end of the sample period, 2002).
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on international evidence, argue that institutional and policy changes play important roles.
However, episodes such as declining newspaper industry, burgeoning online education, and
the increasing use of "big data" in marketing, trading, management and other decisions (such
as the diagnosis of diseases) suggest that machines would replace a large number of tasks
presently performed by highly skilled workers in the not-distant future and thus possible
e¤ects on a great majority of the population might be captured by the present model.
6 Conclusion
Since the Industrial Revolution, mechanization (or automation) has strongly a¤ected types
of tasks humans perform, relative demands for workers of di¤erent skill levels, earnings levels
and inequality, and aggregate output. This paper has developed a Ricardian model of task
assignment and examined how improvements of qualities of machines and an increase in the
relative supply of skilled workers a¤ect these variables. The analysis has shown that tasks
and workers strongly a¤ected by the productivity growth and the e¤ects on earnings and the
inequality change over time. The model is consistent with long-run trends of these variables
in the real economy, except a sharp decline of the inequality in the wartime 1940s and job and
wage polarization after the 1990s, which is beyond the scope of the model with two types of
workers, although the model does capture an important part of the latter development. The
model has also been employed to examine possible future trends of these variables when the
rapid growth of information technology continues. It is found that earnings of both skilled
and unskilled workers increase and earnings inequality falls over time, although the analysis
based on the model with two types of workers may not capture the whole picture.
Several extensions of the model would be fruitful for analyzing the recent evolution of the
labor market quantitatively. First, in order to understand the job and wage polarization more
accurately, the model with more than two type of workers, who di¤er in levels of analytical
ability or ability to perform non-routine tasks, could be developed. Second, empirical works
nd that international trade and o¤shoring have important e¤ects on earnings inequality
after the 1990s, thus it may be interesting to examine e¤ects of these factors and productivity
growth jointly.
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Appendix A: Lemmas
This appendix presents lemmas that examine the shape of (HL) and its relations with
exogenous variables illustrated in Figure 3 of Section 3, and a lemma examining the shape
of (P) and its relations with exogenous variables illustrated in Figure 4. The next lemma
presents the result when c; ca < 1 (c < (>)ca when kakm < (>)
h
lm
), the area below cm =
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
of Figure 2. Note that no assumptions are imposed on magnitude relations
of analytical abilities to manual abilities, although presentations in the lemmas appear to
suppose h > lm, lm > la, and km > ka.
Lemma 1When cm< lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
,c; ca < 1, (HL) is expressed as
Nh
Nl
ln

km
Ak(a)

=
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
ln

Ak(a
)
ka

; when
ka
km
6=1; (14)
Nh
Nl
a =
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
(1 a); when ka
km
=1: (15)
a satisfying the equation decreases with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
.
Unlike the cases below, (HL) is independent of cm. a satisfying the equation decreases
with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
. The next lemma presents the result when c < ca = 1, the area below
cm =
lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
and on or above cm = lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
of Figure 2. This case arises only when
lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
> lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
, ka
km
< h
lm
:
Lemma 2When cm2
h
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
; lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)

, c < ca = 1, which arises only when kakm < hlm ,
(HL) is expressed as
when
ka
km
6=1; Nh
Nl
km
lm
cm
km ka ln

km
Ak(a)

=
1
h lm ln
"
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
lm
km
Ah(a)
Al(a)
(hkm lmka)
h
#
+
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
km ka ln
"
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a)
#
;
(16)
when
ka
km
=1;
Nh
Nl
cma

lm
=
1
h lm

ln

h
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm

 Al(a
)
lm
cm+1

: (17)
a satisfying the equation decreases with cm and NhNl (
@a
@cm
= 0 at cm = lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
), and
decreases (increases) with ka
km
for small (large) cm.
Unlike the previous case, a satisfying (HL) decreases with cm (except at cm= lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
;
where @a

@cm
= 0); and it increases with ka
km
when cm is large. Finally, the next lemma presents
the result when c=ca=1; the area on or above cm = lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
of Figure 2. This case arises
only when lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
< 1, ka
km
< la
lm
:
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Lemma 3When cm  lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
, c = ca = 1, which arises only when kakm < lalm , (HL) is
expressed as
Nh
Nl

1
lm la ln

lakm lmka
(km ka)lm (lm la)kmcm
lm
Al(a)

+
kmcm
(km ka)lmln

(km ka)lm (lm la)kmcm
(lakm lmka)cm

=
1
h lm ln

h
Ah(a)

; when
ka
km
6=1; (18)
Nh
Nl
1
la lm

ln

cmAl(a
)
lm

+1 cm

=
1
h lm ln

h
Ah(a)

; when
ka
km
=1; (19)
where a 2 (0; 1) holds for any cm. a satisfying the equation decreases with cm and NhNl ; and
it increases with ka
km
(limcm!1
@a
@cm
=limcm!1
@a
@ ka
km
=0).
a satisfying (HL) decreases with cm as in the previous case, while it increases with kakm
(limcm!1
@a
@cm
=limcm!1
@a
@ ka
km
=0, though).
Finally, the next lemma presents the shape of (P) and its relations with km, ka; and r.
Lemma 4 cm satisfying (P ); which is positive, increases with a and r, and decreases with
km and ka.
7 Appendix B: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. [Derivation of the LHS of the equation]: When cm < lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
and thus cm< lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
, c=cl(a)<1, the LHS of (HL) equals NhNl timesZ a
0
Z cl(a)
0
1
Al(a)
dcda=
Z a
0
cl(a)
Al(a)
da=
km
lm
cm
Z a
0
da
Ak(a)
: (20)
Hence, when ka
km
6=1; the LHS of (HL) equals
Nh
Nl
km
lm
cm
km ka ln

km
Ak(a)

: (21)
Applying lHôpitals rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka
km
=1 equals
 Nh
Nl
1
lm
cm
lim ka
km
!1(1  kakm )
lim
ka
km
!1
ln

a
ka
km
+1 a

=
Nh
Nl
cm
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
 
a
a ka
km
+1 a
!
=
Nh
Nl
cma

lm
: (22)
[Derivation of the RHS of the equation]: When cm < lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
, ca= ch(1)<1,
the RHS of (HL) is expressed asZ 1
a
Z ch(a)
0
1
Ah(a)
dcda=
Z 1
a
ch(a)
Ah(a)
da=
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
Z 1
a
da
Ak(a)
: (23)
Hence, when ka
km
6=1; the RHS of (HL) equals
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km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
km ka ln

Ak(a
)
ka

: (24)
By applying lHôpitals rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka
km
=1 equals
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
1
lm
cm
lim ka
km
!1(1  kakm )
lim
ka
km
!1
ln

a+(1 a)km
ka

= Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
 
 (1 a)( ka
km
) 2
a+(1 a)km
ka
!
=
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
lm
(1 a): (25)
[Relations of a satisfying the equation with Nh
Nl
and ka
km
]: Clearly, a satisfying
the equation decreases with Nh
Nl
. Noting that, from (21) and (24), (HL) when ka
km
6=1 can be
expressed as
km
lm
cm
km ka

 Nh
Nl
ln

a
ka
km
+1 a

  Al(a
)
Ah(a)
ln

a+(1 a)km
ka

=0; (26)
the derivative of the above equation with respect to ka
km
equals
km
lm
cm
km ka
 
 Nh
Nl
a
a ka
km
+1 a 
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
 (1 a)( ka
km
) 2
a+(1 a)km
ka
!
=
km
lm
cm
km ka
km
Ak(a)

 Nh
Nl
a+
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
(1 a)km
ka

; (27)
where the expression inside the large bracket can be rewritten as
  Nh
Nl
a+
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
(1 a)km
ka
=

ln

Ak(a
)
ka
 1
Nh
Nl

 aln

a+(1 a)km
ka

 (1 a)km
ka
ln

a
ka
km
+1 a

=

ln

Ak(a
)
ka
 1
Nh
Nl
km
ka

a
ka
km
ln

ka
km

 

a
ka
km
+1 a

ln

a
ka
km
+1 a

: (28)
The expression inside the large bracket of the above equation is positive, because the
expression equals 0 at ka
km
= 1 and its derivative with respect to ka
km
equals
a

ln

ka
km

 ln

a
ka
km
+1 a

; (29)
which is negative (positive) for ka
km
< (>)1: Thus, noting that ln

Ak(a
)
ka

> (<)0 for ka
km
< (>
)1, (27) is positive. The derivative of (26) with respect to a is positive from @ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
=@a < 0.
Hence, a satisfying (14) decreases with ka
km
when ka
km
6=1. When ka
km
! 1; (27) equals
lim
ka
km
!1
(
1
lm
cm
1  ka
km
1
a ka
km
+1 a

 Nh
Nl
a+
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
(1 a)km
ka
)
=  cm
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
8><>:
 

a ka
km
+1 a

Al(a
)
Ah(a)
(1 a)( ka
km
) 2  

 Nh
Nl
a+ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
(1 a)km
ka

a
a ka
km
+1 a
2
9>=>;
=
cm
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
(1 a) > 0: (30)
30
where (15) is used to derived the last equality. Hence, the same result holds when ka
km
= 1
as well.
Proof of Lemma 2. [Derivation of the equation]: Since c < 1, the LHS of (HL) equals
(21) (when ka
km
6=1) and (22) (when ka
km
=1) in the proof of Lemma 1.
The RHS of (HL) when ca = 1, ch(1)1, c < 1, ch(a)<1, and kakm 6=1 is expressed
asZ c 1h (1)
a
Z ch(a)
0
dcda
Ah(a)
+
Z 1
c 1h (1)
Z 1
0
dcda
Ah(a)
=
Z c 1h (1)
a
ch(a)
Ah(a)
da+
Z 1
c 1h (1)
da
Ah(a)
=
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
Z c 1h (1)
a
da
Ak(a)
+
Z 1
c 1h (1)
da
Ah(a)
=
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
km ka ln

Ak(a
)
Ak(c
 1
h (1))

+
1
h lm ln

h
Ah(c
 1
h (1))

;
(31)
where c 1h (1); i.e. the value of a when ch(a) = 1, equals, from (1) and (3),
Ah(a)
Ak(a)
=
lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
1
cm
, a(h lm) + lm = lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
1
cm
[ a(km ka) + km]
, a =
lm

Ah(a
)
Al(a)
  cm

(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
+ (h lm)cm
: (32)
Hence, from (31) and
Ak(c
 1
h (1))=
 lm

Ah(a
)
Al(a)
 cm

(km ka)+km
h
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+ (h lm)cm
i
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
+ (h lm)cm
=
(hkm lmka)cm
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
+ (h lm)cm
; (33)
Ah(c
 1
h (1))=
lm

Ah(a
)
Al(a)
 cm

(h lm)+lm
h
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+ (h lm)cm
i
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
+ (h lm)cm
=
lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
(hkm lmka)
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
+ (h lm)cm
; (34)
the RHS of (HL) when ka
km
6=1; equals
1
h lm ln
"
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
lm
km
Ah(a)
Al(a)
(hkm lmka)
h
#
+
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
km ka ln
"
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a)
#
:
(35)
By applying lHôpitals rule to the above equation, the RHS when ka
km
=1 equals
31
1h lm limkakm!1
ln
"
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
lm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
(h lm kakm)
h
#
+
1
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
lim ka
km
!1(1  kakm )
lim
ka
km
!1
ln
264(1  kakm)lmAh(a)Al(a) +(h lm)cm
(h lm kakm )cm
a ka
km
+(1 a)
375
=
1
h lm ln

h
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm

  1
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm lim
ka
km
!1
"
a
a ka
km
+(1 a)+
lm
h lm kakm
 
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
#
=
1
h lm ln

h
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm

  1
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
"
Ah(a
)
h lm  
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
(h lm)cm
#
=
1
h lm

ln

h
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm

 Al(a
)
lm
cm+1

: (36)
[Relations of a satisfying the equation with Nh
Nl
and cm]: When kakm 6= 1, the
derivative of the LHS RHS of (16) with respect to a equals
Nh
Nl
km
lm
cm
1
Ak(a)
+ 1
h lm

1
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
  (km ka)
lm
km
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm

@
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
@a +
km
lm
cm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
1
Ak(a)
  cm
Al(a
)
Ah(a
)
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
@
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
@a   kmlm cmkm ka
@
Al(a
)
Ah(a
)
@a ln

(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a
)

= cm
2664
Nh
Nl
km
lm
1
Ak(a)
+
Al(a
)
Ah(a
)
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
@
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
@a +
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
1
Ak(a)
 
Al(a
)
Ah(a
)
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
@
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
@a   kmlm 1km ka
@
Al(a
)
Ah(a
)
@a ln

(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a
)

3775
=
km
lm
cm
km ka
8<:

Nh
Nl
+
Al(a
)
Ah(a)

km ka
Ak(a)
 
@ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
@a
ln
241+ (km ka)Ah(a)Ak(a)
h
lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
 cm
i
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a)
359=; > 0; (37)
where the last equality is derived by using
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a)
=
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm  (hkm lmka)cmAk(a) +
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a)
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a)
= 1+
(km ka)Ah(a)Ak(a)
h
lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
 cm
i
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a)
>(<)1 when
ka
km
<(>)1 ( * cm< lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
). (38)
The derivative of the LHS-RHS of (16) with respect to cm when kakm 6=1 equals
1
(h lm)cm ln

(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)
h

 
1+ km
lm
cm
km ka
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
(h lm)
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
+
km
lm
1
km ka
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
=
1
(h lm)cm ln

1+
(h lm)hkm
h
cm  lmh kakm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
i
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)

 0 ( * cm lmkm kah
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
); (39)
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where the last equality is derived by using
(km ka)lmAh(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)kmcm
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)
h =
h
(km ka)lmAh(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)kmcm
i
h lmAh(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)+lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)
= 1+
(h lm)hkm
h
cm  lmh kakm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
i
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)
: (40)
Hence, when ka
km
6= 1, a satisfying (16) decreases with Nh
Nl
and cm ( @a

@cm
= 0 at cm =
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
).
The corresponding derivatives when ka
km
! 1 are
a : lim
ka
km
!1
 
1
lm
cm
1  ka
km
(
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
)
Ah(a)

1  ka
km
a ka
km
+1 a 
@ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
@a
ln

1+
(1  ka
km
)Ah(a
)
h
(a ka
km
+1 a) lm
Al(a
) cm
i
(h lm kakm )cm
)!
=  cm
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
8>><>>:

Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
 (a ka
km
+1 a) (1  ka
km
)(1 a)
(a ka
km
+1 a)2  
@
Al(a
)
Ah(a
)
@a

1+
(1  ka
km
)Ah(a
)
h
(a ka
km
+1 a) lm
Al(a
) cm
i
(h lm kakm )cm
 1
 (h lm
ka
km
)Ah(a
)
h
 

(a ka
km
+1 a) lm
Al(a
) cm

+(1  ka
km
)
(1 a)lm
Al(a
)
i
+lm(1  kakm)Ah(a
)
h
(a ka
km
+1 a) lm
Al(a
) cm
i
(h lm kakm )2cm
9>>=>>;
=
cm
lm
(
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
)
Ah(a)

 
@ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
@a
Ah(a
)

lm
Al(a
) cm

(h lm)cm
)
> 0; (41)
cm :
1
(h lm)cm ln

1+
(h lm)h
h
cm  lmh
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
i
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (h lm)

 0: (42)
Therefore, the same results hold when ka
km
= 1 as well.
[Relations of a satisfying the equation with ka
km
]: Since (16) can be expressed as
 Nh
Nl
1
lm
cm
1  ka
km
ln

a
ka
km
+1 a

(43)
=
1
h lm ln
"
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
lm
Ah(a)
Al(a)
(h lm kakm)
h
#
+
1
lm
cm
1  ka
km
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
ln
"
a ka
km
+1 a
h lm kakm
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
+(h lm)cm
cm
#
;
the derivative of the LHS RHS of (16) with respect to ka
km
when ka
km
6=1 equals
 Nh
Nl
1
lm
cm
1  ka
km

ln(a kakm+1 a
)
1  ka
km
+ a

a ka
km
+1 a

  1
lm
cm
(1  ka
km
)2
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
ln

a ka
km
+1 a
h lm kakm
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
cm

+ lm
h lm

Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
  1
h lm kakm

  1
lm
cm
1  ka
km
Al(a
)
Ah(a)

a
a ka
km
+1 a+
lm
h lm kakm
  lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm

= 1
(h lm)(1  kakm )
ln

(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (h lm kakm)
h

 Nh
Nl
1
lm
cm
1  ka
km
a
a ka
km
+1 a+
lm

Ah(a
)
Al(a
)  cm

(h lm kakm )
h
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
i
  1
lm
cm
1  ka
km
Al(a
)
Ah(a)

a
a ka
km
+1 a 
lm(h lm)

Ah(a
)
Al(a
)  cm

(h lm kakm )
h
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
i

= km
km ka
8<: hNhNl + Al(a)Ah(a)ikmlm aAk(a)cm+ km

1 cm Al(a
)
Ah(a)

hkm lmka +
1
h lm ln

(km ka)lmAh(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)kmcm
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)
h
9=; : (44)
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Since the derivative on (HL) is examined, by substituting (16) into the above equation
km
km ka
8>><>>:
 
h
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
i
km
lm
a
Ak(a)
cm+
km

1 cm Al(a
)
Ah(a)

hkm lmka +
Nh
Nl
km
lm
cm
km ka ln

km
Ak(a)

 km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
km ka ln

(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)+(h lm)cm
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a
)

9>>=>>;
= kmcm
(km ka)2
km
lm
8><>:
Nh
Nl
h
ln

km
Ak(a)

+1  km
Ak(a)
i
  Al(a)
Ah(a)

(km ka)Ah(a)Al(a) 1cm
Al(a
)kmcm lmAk(a)
Ak(a)(hkm lmka) +ln

(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)+(h lm)cm
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a
)

9>=>;: (45)
The above expression is positive at cm= lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
from (27) in the proof of Lemma 1 and
is negative at cm= lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
from (56) in the proof of Lemma 3. Further, the derivative of
the expression inside the big bracket of the above equation with respect to cm equals
 (km ka) 1c2m
lm
hkm lmka 
Al(a
)
Ah(a)

h lm
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
  1
cm

= lm
km
km ka
cm

  1
cm
km
hkm lmka+
1
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm

=  l2m
km
1
c2m
(km ka)2
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)  cm
i
(hkm lmka)
h
(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
i ;
(46)
which is negative for cm2
h
lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
; lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
i
from Ah(a
)
Al(a)
 cm Ah(a)km lmAk(a)Al(a)km =
(hkm lmka)a
Al(a)km
>
0 ( lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
> lm
km
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
, ka
km
< h
lm
): Hence, there exists a unique cm 2 ( lmkm kah
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
; lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
)
such that (44) is positive (negative) for smaller (greater) cm.
When ka
km
! 1, (44) equals
lim
ka
km
!1
1
1  ka
km
(
 
h
Nh
Nl
+ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
i
1
lm
a
a ka
km
+1 a cm+
1 cm Al(a
)
Ah(a)
h lm kakm
+ 1
h lm ln

(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (h lm kakm )
h
)
=   lim
ka
km
!1
8<:hNhNl + Al(a)Ah(a)i 1lm a2cm(a kakm+1 a)2+ lm

1 cm Al(a
)
Ah(a)

(h lm kakm)2
+ 1
h lm

 lmAh(a
)
Al(a
)
(1  ka
km
)lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
+ lm
h lm kakm
9=;
=  
8<:hNhNl + Al(a)Ah(a)ia2cmlm   lm

1 cm Al(a
)
Ah(a)

1
cm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)  1

(h lm)2
9=; : (47)
The above expression is positive at cm= lmh
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
from (30) in the proof of Lemma 1 and is
negative at cm = lmAl(a) from (58) in the proof of Lemma 3. Further, the derivative of the
expression with respect to cm is negative. Hence, the same result holds when kakm = 1 as well.
Proof of Lemma 3. [Derivation of the equation]: The LHS of (HL) when c = 1 ,
cl(a
)1 and ka
km
6=1 equals Nh
Nl
times
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Z c 1l (1)
0
Z cl(a)
0
dcda
Al(a)
+
Z a
c 1l (1)
Z 1
0
dcda
Al(a)
=
Z c 1l (1)
0
cl(a)
Al(a)
da+
Z a
c 1l (1)
da
Al(a)
=
km
lm
cm
Z c 1l (1)
0
da
Ak(a)
+
Z a
c 1l (1)
da
Al(a)
=
km
lm
cm
km ka ln

km
Ak(c
 1
l (1))

+
1
lm la ln

Al(c
 1
l (1))
Al(a)

;
(48)
where the value of c 1l (1); i.e. a when cl(a) = 1, equals, from (2) and (3),
Al(a)
Ak(a)
=
lm
km
1
cm
,  a(lm la) + lm = lm
km
1
cm
[ a(km ka)+km]
, a = lm(1 cm)
(km ka) lmkm   (lm la)cm
: (49)
Hence, from (48) and
Ak(c
 1
l (1))=
 lm(1 cm)(km ka)+km
h
(km ka) lmkm (lm la)cm
i
(km ka) lmkm   (lm la)cm
=
(lakm lmka)cm
(km ka) lmkm   (lm la)cm
; (50)
Al(c
 1
l (1))=
 lm(1 cm)(lm la)+lm
h
(km ka) lmkm (lm la)cm
i
(km ka) lmkm   (lm la)cm
=
lm
km
(lakm lmka)
(km ka) lmkm   (lm la)cm
; (51)
the LHS of (HL) when ka
km
6=1 equals
Nh
Nl

1
lm la ln

lakm lmka
(km ka)lm (lm la)kmcm
lm
Al(a)

+
kmcm
(km ka)lm ln

(km ka)lm (lm la)kmcm
(lakm lmka)cm

:
(52)
Applying lHôpitals rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka
km
=1 equals
Nh
Nl
(
1
lm la limkakm!1
ln
"
la lm kakm
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
lm
Al(a)
#
+
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lim ka
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!1(1  kakm)lm
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km
!1
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"
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
(la lm kakm)cm
#)
=
Nh
Nl
(
1
lm la ln

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cmAl(a)

+cm lim
ka
km
!1
 
1
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
  1
la lm kakm
!)
=
Nh
Nl
1
la lm

ln

cmAl(a
)
lm

+1 cm

: (53)
[a 2 (0; 1) for any cm]: a < 1 is obvious from the equation. Since cm lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
, a=0
is possible only at cm = 1. However, at cm = 1, the equation becomes
Nh
Nl
1
lm la ln

lm
Al(a)

=
1
h lm ln

h
Ah(a)

and thus a>0.
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[Relations of a satisfying the equation with Nh
Nl
; cm; and kakm ]: Since the derivative
of the LHS RHS of (18) and (19) with respect to a equals Nh
Nl
1
Al(a)
+ 1
Ah(a)
> 0; a satisfying
the equation decreases with Nh
Nl
.
When ka
km
6=1, a satisfying (18) decreases with cm, because the derivative of the expres-
sion inside the large curly bracket of (18) with respect to cm equals
1  (lm la)kmcm
(km ka)lm

km
(km ka)lm (lm la)kmcm 
km
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(lakm lmka)cm

=
1
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)lm
ln
"
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(1  ka
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)lm
la lm kakm
#
> 0: (54)
limcm!1
@a
@cm
=0 is clear from the above equation.
Since (18) can be expressed as
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"
la lm kakm
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
lm
Al(a)
#
+
cm
(1  ka
km
)lm
ln
"
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
(la lm kakm)cm
#)
=
1
h lm ln

h
Ah(a)

; (55)
when ka
km
6= 1, the derivative of the expression inside the large curly bracket of (18) with
respect to ka
km
equals
lm
lm la  cm1  ka
km
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
 
lm
lm la  cm1  ka
km
la lm kakm
+
cm
(1  ka
km
)2lm
ln
"
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
(la lm kakm)cm
#
=  
 
lm
lm la 
cm
1  ka
km
!
(lm la)(1 cm)
[(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm](la lm kakm)
+
cm
(1  ka
km
)2lm
ln
"
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
(la lm kakm)cm
#
=   cm
(1  ka
km
)2lm
 
1 cm
cm
(1  ka
km
)lm
la lm kakm
  ln
"
1+
1 cm
cm
(1  ka
km
)lm
la lm kakm
#!
< 0: (56)
The derivative is negative because the expression inside the large parenthesis of (56) equals
0 at cm = 1 and, when kakm < (>)1, it increases (decreases) with
1 cm
cm
(1  ka
km
)lm
la lm kakm
and thus
decreases with cm. Hence, a satisfying (18) increases with kakm when
ka
km
6=1. limcm!1 @a@ ka
km
=0
is clear from the above equation.
The corresponding derivatives when ka
km
! 1 are
cm : lim
ka
km
!1
(
1
(1  ka
km
)lm
ln
"
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
(la lm kakm)cm
#)
=
 1
lm
lim
ka
km
!1
"
 lm
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
+
lm
la lm kakm
#
=
1
la lm
1 cm
cm
> 0: (57)
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ka
km
: lim
ka
km
!1
(
  cm
(1  ka
km
)2lm
 
1 cm
cm
(1  ka
km
)lm
la lm kakm
 ln
"
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
(la lm kakm)cm
#!)
= lim
ka
km
!1
(
cm
2(1  ka
km
)lm
 
1 cm
cm
 (la lm kakm)lm+(1  kakm)l2m
(la lm kakm )2
 
"
 lm
(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm
+
lm
la lm kakm
#!)
=
cm
2lm
 
1 cm
cm
lim
ka
km
!1
2l2m(la lm)
(la lm kakm)3
+ lim
ka
km
!1
"
 l2m
[(1  ka
km
)lm (lm la)cm]2
+
l2m
(la lm kakm)2
#!
=
cm
2lm
l2m
(la lm)2

2
1 cm
cm
+

1  1
c2m

=  1
2
lm
(la lm)2
(1 cm)2
cm
< 0; (58)
where la lm > 0 from lmkm
Ak(a
)
Al(a)
< 1, 1 < la
lm
. Therefore, the same results hold when ka
km
=1
as well.
Proof of Lemma 4. [Relations of cm satisfying (P) with a; km; ka; and r]: Derivatives
of the LHS of (P) with respect to a, cm; km; and ka equal
a :
@Ah(a
)
Al(a)
@a
lm
km
r
cm
Z 1
a
Z minfch(a);1g
0
dcda
Ah(a)
> 0; (59)
cm :   lm
km
r
c2m
(Z a
0
Z minfcl(a);1g
0
dcda
Al(a)
+
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
Z 1
a
Z minfch(a);1g
0
dcda
Ah(a)
)
<0; (60)
km :   1
km

1 r
Z a
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
dcda
cAk(a)
+
Z 1
a
Z 1
minfch(a);1g
dadc
cAk(a)

 r
Z a
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
(1 a)dcda
c(Ak(a))2
+
Z a
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
(1 a)dcda
c(Ak(a))2

< 0; (61)
ka :   r
Z a
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
adcda
c(Ak(a))2
+
Z a
0
Z 1
minfcl(a);1g
adcda
c(Ak(a))2

< 0; (62)
where cl(a) = ch(a) = c; 1cl(a)Ak(a) =
lm
km
1
cm
1
Al(a)
; and 1
ch(a)Ak(a)
= lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
1
cm
1
Ah(a)
are used
to derive the equations. The results are straightforward from the equations.
[(P) does not hold at cm = 0]: Noting that cl(a) = kmlm
Al(a)
Ak(a)
cm and ch(a) = kmlm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
Ah(a)
Ak(a)
cm;
when cm!0, the LHS of (P) becomes
r
Z a
0
da
Ak(a)
+r
Z 1
a
da
Ak(a)
+r
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
dadc
cAk(a)
= r
Z 1
0
da
Ak(a)
  r
km ka ln(
km
ka
)lim
c!0
ln c = +1 > 1: (63)
Hence, (P) does not hold at cm=0:
Proof of Proposition 1. At cm=1, cl(a); ch(a) >1 from (11), thus (P) equals
lm
km
r
Z a
0
da
Al(a)
+
lm
km
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
r
Z 1
a
da
Ah(a)
= 1: (64)
When km is very small, the LHS of the above equation is strictly greater than 1 for any
a 2 [0; 1] (thus, (P) does not hold for any cm and a from Lemma 4), or a satisfying the
37
equation is weakly smaller than a 2 (0; 1) satisfying (HL) at cm=1 (a 2 (0; 1) holds on
(HL) from Lemma 3). In such case, there is no a 2 (0; 1) and cm<1 satisfying both (HL)
and (P), and thus machines are not employed, i.e. cm=1, in equilibrium, where equilibrium
a is determined from (HL) with cm=1.
When km becomes large enough that a satisfying (64) is greater than a 2 (0; 1) satis-
fying (HL) at cm=1, an equilibrium with cm< 1 exists from shapes of (HL) and (P). The
dynamics of cm and a are straightforward from shapes of the two loci. The dynamics of
c and ca are from c=min
n
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ak(a)
cm;1
o
, ca=min
n
h
ka
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm;1
o
, and the assumptions
that ka
km
is time-invariant and satises ka
km
< la
lm
. The dynamics of cl(a) and ch(a) are from
those of the other variables.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) When cm  lmkm kah
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
; earnings of skilled workers increase
over time from Propositions 4 (iii) and 5 (iii) below. Earnings of both types of workers
increase when cm < lmkm
ka
h
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
from Proposition 6 (iii) below. (ii) is straightforward from
Proposition 1 and the earnings equations (eq. 13).
(iii) Y decreases with the LHS and the RHS of (HL) from (8). When c = ca = 1 and
ka
km
6= 1, the RHS of (HL) equals 1
h lm ln

h
Ah(a)

from Lemma 3, which decreases with the
growth of km and ka with constant kakm from Proposition 1. When c
 < ca < 1 and kakm 6= 1,
the RHS of (HL) equals km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
cm
km ka ln

Ak(a
)
ka

from (24) in the proof of Lemma 1, which
decreases with the productivity growth from Proposition 1. When c < ca = 1 and kakm 6= 1,
the derivative of the RHS of (HL) with respect to cm equals, from (39) in the proof of Lemma
2 and (16),
  1
(h lm)cm ln

1+
(h lm)hkm
h
cm  lmh kakm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
)
i
lm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) (hkm lmka)

+
Nh
Nl
km
lm
1
km   ka ln

km
Ak(a)

=
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
1
km ka ln

(km ka) lmkm
Ah(a
)
Al(a
) +(h lm)cm
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a
)

> 0; (65)
and the derivative with respect to a equals, from (37) in the proof of Lemma 2 ,
 km
lm
cm
km ka
(
Al(a
)
Ah(a)
km ka
Ak(a)
 
@ Al(a
)
Ah(a)
@a
ln

1+
(km ka)Ah(a
)
Ak(a
)
h
lm
km
Ak(a
)
Al(a
)  cm
i
(hkm lmka)cm
Ak(a
)
)
< 0: (66)
From signs of the derivatives and Proposition 1, the RHS of (HL) decreases with the pro-
ductivity growth. Hence, Y increases over time when ka
km
6= 1. The result when ka
km
= 1 can
be proved similarly.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since an increase in Nh
Nl
shifts (HL) to the left on the (a; cm)
space from Lemmas 1 3, the result that cm and a decrease is straightforward from Figures
7 9. Then, wl = lmkm rcm rises and whwl =
Ah(a
)
Al(a)
falls. Since c  min
n
km
lm
Al(a
)
Ak(a)
cm;1
o
; c falls
when c<1 from ka
km
< la
lm
, da

d
Nh
Nl
< 0; and dcm
d
Nh
Nl
< 0. cl(a) decreases from dcm
d
Nh
Nl
< 0: Proofs of
the results for ch(a); ca, wh; and Y are in the proof of Proposition 7.
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